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1. Introduction 
It is standard practice to measure equity returns as dividends plus capital gains.  Indeed, all 
known data sources measure equity returns in this way.  However, in a dividend imputation system, 
there is potentially a third component of returns—franking credits.  To the extent that franking 
credits are valued by the market, this value must be added to the standard return measure.  Officer 
(1994) makes this point in the paper that develops the cost of capital framework under a dividend 
imputation tax system.   
If franking credits form part of the equity return for individual firms, they must also form a 
part of the market return.  Therefore, if franking credits have value, this value must be reflected in 
estimates of the MRP.  However, standard estimates of the MRP ignore franking credits entirely.  
Hence, if the MRP is estimated using returns that are measured in the standard way (reflecting 
dividends and capital gains only), the assumed value of franking credits must be added to compute a 
grossed-up MRP, which can then be used in the CAPM to compute the cost of equity capital. 
In this paper, we review the mathematically deterministic relationship between the assumed 
value of franking credits and the estimate of MRP.  This is the framework developed by Officer 
(1994).  Our focus in this paper is not on how to best estimate the value of franking credits or the 
market risk premium, but on the relationship between them.  If franking credits are assumed to have 
value, the MRP must reflect this.  It is inconsistent to assume that franking credits are valuable such 
that they reduce corporate cost of equity, but then ignore them when estimating the market risk 
premium.   
The main contribution of the paper is that we derive an explicit relationship between the value 
of franking credits (gamma), the MRP, and the assumed tax rate.  If tax rates and the value of 
franking credits are assumed to be high, the MRP must also be high.  This is because higher tax 
payments generate more tax credits, which are more valuable if gamma ( )γ  is assumed to be high.  
This value of franking credits must then be added to standard estimates of MRP.   
However, the assumptions about tax rates and the value of franking credits must also be 
consistent with observed dividend yields.  This is because franking credits can only be distributed 
with dividend payments.  It would be inconsistent to assume that large amounts of franking credits 
are created and that these credits are valuable to investors if observed dividend yields were wholly 
insufficient to distribute these credits to investors.  In this paper, we examine the mathematical 
relationship between these various parameters.  We then examine how standard assumptions about 
parameter values would have to be changed in order to preserve internal consistency. 
In the next section, we revisit the Officer (1994) framework and provide an intuitive 
economic explanation of how franking credits might affect the cost of capital of Australian firms.  
Section Three derives the deterministic mathematical relationship between gamma and MRP.  In 
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Section Four, we draw several examples from Australian regulatory determinations and demonstrate 
that the parameter values typically assumed are internally inconsistent.  We also explore several 
methods for restoring internal consistency.  Section Five examines attempts that have been made to 
adjust MRP estimates for the value of franking credits and Section Six concludes. 
 
2.  Interpretation of the Officer (1994) Framework 
Officer (1994) develops a framework for consistently defining the cost of capital and cash 
flows in a dividend imputation tax system.  This framework, and particularly the definitions of 
weighted-average cost of capital (WACC), have been widely adopted in Australian practice. 
Officer (1994) presents definitions of WACC on a before and after corporate tax basis.  In this 
section, we begin by examining his first definition of after corporate tax cash flows and WACC, for 
ease of exposition.  Under this definition, the effect of franking credits is incorporated in the 
discount rate—the cost of equity capital.  The same arguments apply regardless of which definition 
of WACC is used and whether franking credits are incorporated in the WACC or the cash flows.  
We subsequently examine the vanilla WACC specification, under which the effect of franking 
credits is incorporated in the cash flows.  We demonstrate that the two approaches are entirely 
equivalent and lead to the same conclusions, based on the same intuition.  Our points relate to the 
internal consistency of various parameter estimates.  Using an estimate of γ  in defining cash flows 
that is inconsistent with the estimate of MRP used to estimate WACC is just as problematic as if 
both are incorporated in the WACC estimate.  Separating inconsistencies may make them harder to 
spot, but does not eliminate their effect.  Moreover, Officer demonstrates that all of his WACC/cash 
flow definitions produce identical results so long as they are applied consistently.   
Officer (1994) begins by defining after corporate tax cash flows as ( )TX o −1  , consistent with 
the standard textbook treatment.  Here oX represents operating cash flows and T represents the 
relevant corporate tax rate.  The definition of the after corporate tax discount rate that is consistent 
with this definition of cash flows is stated in his Equation (7) as: 
 
( ) ( )TV
Dr
T
T
V
Srr DEi −+−−
−= 1
11
1
γ  
 
where: 
ir  is the weighted-average cost of capital, reflecting the tax deductibility of interest and the value of 
franking credits, 
Er  is the return on equity capital required by investors, 
Dr  is the return on debt capital required by investors, 
(1)
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V
S  is the proportion of equity finance, 
V
D  is the proportion of debt finance, 
 T  is the corporate tax rate, and 
γ  is the value of franking credits. 
In this framework, Dr  is the return that debtholders require (before personal tax) to 
compensate them for the risk involved in lending to the firm.  Since these interest payments are tax 
deductible at the corporate level, the firm’s after-tax cost of debt capital is ( )TrD −1 .  That is, if 
debtholders require a return of 7% and the corporate tax rate is 30%, the firm’s after-tax cost of debt 
is 4.9%.  Of the 7% required return, 4.9% is provided by the firm and 2.1% is effectively provided 
by government via the tax system. 
The same applies to the cost of equity.  Here, Er  is the return that equityholders require 
(before personal tax) to compensate them for the risk involved in owning shares in the firm.  In the 
Australian regulatory framework, and in commercial practice, Er  is usually estimated using the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  This provides an estimate of the return that the 
equityholders require.  As is the case for debt, there is a difference between the investors’ required 
return and what the firm must pay if a government tax subsidy is relevant.  In particular, 
equityholders require a total after corporate tax return of Er .  This return potentially has three 
components: dividends, capital gains, and franking credits.  The firm is responsible for generating 
dividends and capital gains.  Franking credits are paid by government via the tax system.  Officer’s 
WACC formula quantifies the proportion of Er  that must be generated by the firm, ( )γ−−
−
11
1
T
T   , 
and the proportion that is paid by government via the imputation tax system, ( )γ
γ
−− 11 T
T .  Thus, the 
firm’s after-tax cost of equity capital is ( )γ−−
−
11
1
T
TrE .  Indeed this is the key contribution of Officer 
(1994).  He derives the proportion of the required return on equity that must be generated by the 
firm via dividends and capital gains. 
Of course, this point is well recognized in the academic and practitioner literature.  Copeland, 
Koller and Murrin (2000, p. 134), for example, note that the WACC is “the opportunity cost to all 
the capital providers weighted by their relative contribution to the company’s total capital.”  They 
also note (p. 134-5) that, “the opportunity cost to a class of investors equals the rate of return the 
investors could expect to earn on other investments of equivalent risk.  The cost to the company 
equals the investors’ costs less any tax benefits received by the company (for example, the tax 
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shield provided by interest expense).”  In a dividend imputation system, the government may also 
subsidize equity returns via the payment of franking tax credits.  
In the detailed numerical example in his Appendix, Officer (1994, pp. 11 - 17), shows how 
the CAPM can be used to derive a required return on equity of 17.7% and that the firm’s cost of 
equity is: 
 
( ) ( ) %4.135.0139.01
39.01%7.17
11
1 =−−
−=−−
−
γT
TrE  
 
using the parameter values assumed in the example.  That is, the imputation tax system has reduced 
the firm’s cost of equity capital by 4.3% in this case.  The value of this reduction in the firm’s cost 
of equity is capitalized into the stock price.  In this case, the value of equity increases from $120 
million (under a classical tax system) to $158.361 million (under an imputation system in which 
5.0=γ ).  Officer demonstrates that the equityholders’ required return does not change.  What 
changes is the proportion of this return that must be generated by the firm.  In a classical system, the 
firm has to generate all of this return.  In an imputation system, the government funds some of this 
required return (in fact 4.3%) which reduces the firm’s after tax cost of equity from 17.7% to 
13.4%.  That is, the CAPM tells us what return equityholders require (a return that is measured after 
company tax but before personal tax) and Officer (1994) derives the proportion of that return that 
must be generated by the firm, ( )γ−−
−
11
1
T
T . 
Alternatively, Officer (1994) also shows how the value of franking credits can be 
incorporated in the firm’s cash flows rather than the discount rate.  In his Equation (12), Officer 
defines the vanilla WACC as: 
 
.
V
Dr
V
Srr DEiii +=  
 
This discount rate should be applied to cash flows defined as in his Equation (11): 
 
( ) ( )( ) DD XTXX +−−− γ110 , 
 
where DX  represents interest payments to debtholders. 
That is, under an imputation system, the cash flow to equity holders is: 
 
(2)
(3)
(4)
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( ) ( )( ).110 γ−−− TXX D  
 
Without imputation ( )0=γ , the cash flow to equity holders would be: 
 
( )( ).10 TXX D −−  
 
Thus, the component of the cash flow to equity that is due to the value of franking credits is 
the difference between the two: 
 
( ) .0 TXX D γ−  
 
Therefore, the proportion of the total cash flow to equity that is due to franking credits is: 
 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) .11110
0
γ
γ
γ
γ
−−=−−−
−
T
T
TXX
TXX
D
D  
 
This is the same proportion of the cost of equity that was due to franking credits, as derived 
above.  That is, if we prefer to incorporate the value of franking credits in the discount rate, we can 
conclude that ( )γ
γ
−− 11 T
T  proportion of the cost of equity is paid by the government via franking 
credits.  If we prefer to put the value of franking credits into the cash flows instead, we conclude 
that ( )γ
γ
−− 11 T
T  proportion of the total cash flow to equity is paid by the government via franking 
credits.  In both cases, the balance, ( )γ−−
−
11
1
T
T , must be generated by the firm itself. 
 
3. The Relationship Between Gamma and MRP 
3.1. The Cost of Equity Capital 
The dominant commercial practice in Australia is to use the CAPM to estimate the return 
required by equityholders.  This is the equilibrium return that they require on their equity 
investment after corporate tax but before personal tax.  This return is defined as: 
 
( ) efmfe rkrk β−+= ˆˆ  
 
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
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where ekˆ  and mkˆ  represent the expected returns on equity and the Australian market portfolio 
respectively; fr   the risk-free rate; and βe is the firm’s equity beta. 
Officer (1994) shows that the market return should include the value of franking credits such 
that the expected return on equity is the total return, inclusive of dividends, capital gains and 
franking credits.  If market returns are defined in terms of dividends and capital gains only, Officer 
(1994, eq. 18) shows that the value of franking credits must be added back to obtain the total after 
corporate tax market return.  The CAPM then yields the total required return on equity, part of 
which must be provided by the firm and part of which is provided by government via franking 
credits. 
 
3.2. Return to Equityholders under Dividend Imputation 
Under a dividend imputation system, the expected return to equityholders comprises a return 
from dividends and capital gains, plus the benefit of franking credits, which can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
−= γ
γ
γ 11
ˆ
11
1ˆˆ
T
Tk
T
Tkk eee  
 
where ekˆ  is the total required return on equity, which may be estimated using the CAPM, so long as 
the MRP includes the value of franking credits; T is the corporate tax rate; and γ is the market value 
of franking credits as a proportion of franking credits created.  This specifically recognizes that part 
of the return required by equityholders is provided by the firm via dividends and capital gains and 
part is provided by government via franking credits. 
On the right hand side of the equation, the first term represents the return on equity from 
dividends and capital gains, while the second term represents the return on equity from the benefits 
of dividend imputation. Allocating the total return to equityholders into these two components we 
can say that: 
Proportion of return from dividends and capital gains = ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
−
γ11
1
T
T  
 
Proportion of return from dividend imputation = ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−− γ
γ
11 T
T  
 
These proportions are based on Officer (1994) and are illustrated in terms of discount rates 
and cash flows in Section 2.  Table 1 and Figure 1 present these proportions for alternative values 
for the corporate tax rate and the value of franking credits. For example, with a corporate tax rate of 
(10)
(11)
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30% and gamma set at 0.5, 82% of the total return required by (or cash flow available to) 
equityholders is comprised of dividends and capital gains, while 18% of the total return (or cash 
flow) consists of franking benefits. 
Table 1: Proportion of returns to equityholders from dividends and capital gains versus 
franking credits under alternative values for the corporate tax rate and the value of franking 
credits (gamma) 
 
Gamma Tax rate 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 
Proportion of returns attributable to dividends and capital gains (%) 
10% 100 97 95 92 90 
20% 100 94 89 84 80 
30% 100 90 82 76 70 
40% 100 86 75 67 60 
50% 100 80 67 57 50 
Proportion of returns attributable to franking credits (%) 
10% 0 3 5 8 10 
20% 0 6 11 16 20 
30% 0 10 18 24 30 
40% 0 14 25 33 40 
50% 0 20 33 43 50 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of return on equity from dividends and capital gains under alternative 
tax rates and the value of franking credits (gamma) 
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3.3. Franking Credits and the MRP 
Recall that implementation of the CAPM in this setting requires a market risk premium 
( )fm rk −ˆ  that includes the value of franking credits. This framework, combined with the discussion 
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in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, implies that we can derive an expression for the market risk premium.  
Combining the equations in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we have: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−+⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −− −=−+ γγγβ 11ˆ11 1ˆˆ T TkT Tkrkr eeefmf . 
 
For a firm with average systematic risk (βe = 1, representative of the market portfolio), the 
cost of equity capital is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−+⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −− −=−+ γγγ 11ˆ11 1ˆˆ T TkT Tkrkr eefmf . 
 
Consider the second term on the left-hand side of the equation, the market risk 
premium ( )fm rk −ˆ . This term represents the equityholders’ compensation for bearing systematic 
risk, and includes the value of franking benefits. These franking benefits are quantified in the 
second term on the right-hand side of the equation, ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−− γ
γ
11
ˆ
T
Tke . Hence, if we subtract the risk-
free rate from both sides of the equation, we have: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
  
creditsfranking 
from premium Risk
   
inscapital ga and dividends
from premium Risk +=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−+⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
−=−
MRP
T
Tkr
T
Tkrk efefm γ
γ
γ 11
ˆ
11
1ˆˆ
. 
 
Recall that Officer (1994) has shown that dividends and capital gains make up a proportion, 
( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
−
γ11
1
T
T , of the total return to equity, the balance due to the value of franking credits.  Next, 
define fcMRP  to be the market risk premium including franking credits and dcMRP  to be the market 
risk premium from dividends and capital gains only.  Now, the total return on the market portfolio, 
including franking credits is ffc rMRP +  and the return from dividends and capital gains only is 
fdc rMRP + . 
Hence,  
 
(12)
(13)
(14)
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( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
γ11
1
T
T
credits.franking  and
inscapital ga dividends,
from urnMarket ret
gains.
capital and dividends
from urnMarket ret
. 
 
This implies that: 
 
[ ] ( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −− −+=+ γ11 1T TrMRPrMRP ffcfdc , 
 
in which case: 
 
( ) ( )[ ] .11/1 fdcffc rTT
MRPr
MRP −−−−
+= γ  
 
Note that this formulation is entirely consistent with the analysis of Officer (1994, p. 9).  In 
his Equation 17, Officer states that the market return including the value of franking credits is equal 
to the return as traditionally measured (dividends and capital gains only) plus the value of franking 
credits: 
,
1−
+=′
t
t
tt P
C
rr γ  
 
where tr′  is the all-inclusive market return, tr  is the traditionally measured return, γ  is the value of 
franking credits, and 
1−t
t
P
C  is the franking credit yield.  Officer (1994) defines tC to be the amount of 
tax credits per share distributed at time t.  However, this is a typographical error and tC  actually 
refers to credits created not distributed.  It is well-known that γ  is applied to franking credits 
created not distributed, and this is also consistent with the detailed calculations in Officer’s 
appendix.  Thus, 
1−t
t
P
C  must be interpreted as the amount of franking credits created per dollar of 
stock price. 
This is also consistent with the adjustment proposed by Lally (2004): 
 
,
DIV
C
UDrr disttt +=′  
 
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
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where U is the value to the relevant investor of franking credits once distributed, D is the cash 
dividend yield, and DIVCdist  is the ratio of distributed imputation credits to dividends paid.  Note 
that U applies to franking credits that have been distributed, whereas γ  applies to franking credits 
created, so DRU ×=γ  where DR represents the distribution rate, or the ratio of franking credits 
distributed to franking credits created ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ =
created
dist
C
C
DR .  Thus, Lally’s adjustment can be written as: 
 
.
11 −−
==
t
createddist
t
dist
P
C
DIV
C
P
DIV
DRDIV
C
DU γγ  
 
which is identical to the Officer adjustment in Equation (18). 
To establish the equivalence of our Equation (17) and the Officer/Lally adjustment in 
Equation (18), first note that the market return (after company tax) measured in the standard way is: 
 
.dcft MRPrr +=  
 
The amount of corporate tax paid on this return (and hence the amount of franking credits 
created per dollar of stock price) is: 
 
( ) .
11 1−
=−+=− t
t
dcft P
C
T
TMRPr
T
Tr 1 
 
Finally, the return including the value of franking credits can be written as: 
 
.fcft MRPrr +=′  
 
Substituting Equations (21)-(23) into Equation 17 yields: 
 
( ) .
1 T
TMRPrMRPrMRPr dcfdcffcf −+++=+ γ  
 
which implies that: 
 
                                                 
1 Here, we gross-up the after corporate tax return to a pre corporate tax return by dividing by ( )T−1 .  Then we 
compute corporate tax paid by multiplying this pre-tax return by the corporate tax rate, T.  
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(20)
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( )
( ) ( )⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ − −−+=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−++=+
T
TMRPr
T
TMRPrMRPr
dcf
dcffcf
1
11
1
1
γ
γ
, 
 
which is equivalent to Equation (17). 
That is, the value of franking credits must be added to the standard measure of the MRP.  The 
required adjustment depends only on the assumptions made about the corporate tax rate and the 
value of franking credits. 
 
4.  Consistency Between Parameters in Australian Practice 
Having established the adjustment that is required to properly incorporate the value of 
franking credits and that our approach is exactly equivalent to the adjustment derived by Officer 
(1994) and Lally (2004), we now examine Australian corporate practice.  Although use of the 
CAPM is widespread, little information is available about the individual parameter estimates that 
are adopted by individual participants.  For this reason, we focus on regulatory determinations.  
Australian regulators have uniformly adopted the Officer (1994) framework for estimating the 
required return on capital.  Their determinations also contain considerable detail about individual 
parameter estimates and the reasons for adopting them.  Moreover, there are more than ten such 
regulatory bodies who collectively regulate infrastructure assets whose value exceeds $100 billion.  
This makes the Australian regulatory setting an ideal and important one in which to examine any 
cost of capital issue.   
The goal of this section is two fold.  First, we demonstrate that the set of parameter values that 
is commonly used in Australian corporate practice is inconsistent with Equation (17).  That is, the 
parameters collectively are inconsistent with the framework to which they apply!  Second, we 
examine various alternatives for restoring consistency.  This requires a change to the value of at 
least one parameter.  We examine how each parameter in turn would have to be adjusted in order to 
restore consistency and examine the reasonableness of each adjustment in light of external data. 
 
4.1.  Interpretation of current practice  
It is common for the following parameter estimates to be used in Australian regulatory 
determinations: MRP = 6%; %30=T ; 5.0=γ .  Also, assume that the relevant risk-free rate is 6%.  
It is unclear whether Australian regulators, in general, consider that this estimate of the MRP 
includes the value of franking credits.  As most regulatory determinations ignore this issue, we 
separately examine each possibility in turn. 
(25)
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MRP = 6% incorporates the value of franking credits 
 
If the 6% estimate of MRP is assumed to include the value of franking credits, Equation (17) 
implies that: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] %,65.013.013.01
%6
%6
111
−−−−
+=
−−−−
+=
dc
f
dcf
fc
MRP
r
TT
MRPr
MRP γ  
 
which implies that the MRP from dividends and capital gains (the standard measure) is only 3.9%.  
In other words, in the absence of dividend imputation, the average stock on the Australian equity 
market would be expected to earn a return from dividends and capital gains just 3.9% above the 
risk-free rate. This is unreasonable, considering the historical evidence.  
For example, Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2003) report that the average arithmetic mean of 
Australian equity returns (measured as dividends plus capital gains only) relative to Government 
bonds was 7.6% from 1900-2002 with a standard deviation of 19.0%, which is significantly 
different from 3.9% at a level of just 2%. And out of the 16 developed markets studied, they report 
that only two had a market risk premium of less than 3.9% (based on dividends and capital gains).  
Also, the data sources that are used to justify the estimate of 6% are generally based on dividends 
and capital gains only.  For example, the Queensland Competition Authority recently adopted a 6% 
estimate “primarily on the basis of historical averaging methodology” in which franking credits are 
ignored entirely2. 
Moreover, this interpretation is also demonstrably inconsistent with observed dividend yields.  
If the risk-free rate is 6% and the MRP estimate of 6% is assumed to include the value of franking 
credits, the total return required on the market portfolio is 12% ( )%6%6 +=+ MRPrf .  Recall that 
this is an after corporate tax return.  We have shown in Section 3.2 that application of the results in 
Officer (1994) imply that if 5.0=γ  and T = 30% equity investors receive about 18% of their return 
from franking credits and the remaining 82% from dividends and capital gains.  That is, the return 
from franking credits is assumed to be about 2.1% with the remainder coming from dividends and 
capital gains.  If we further assume that franking credits, once distributed, are valued at about 60% 
                                                 
2 QCA. (2004). Draft Determination Regulation of Electricity Distribution, p. 98. 
(26)
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of face value3, the yield of franking credits must be 3.5% ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
6.0
%1.2 .  That is, the average firm in the 
market portfolio must distribute franking credits with face value of 3.5% of the stock price.  At a 
corporate tax rate of 30%, with every $1 of dividends paid, franking credits of 43 cents 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−=− 3.01
3.0
1 T
T  can be distributed.  Therefore, to generate a franking credit yield of 3.5%, the 
average firm must generate a dividend yield of 8.2% ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
43.0
%5.3 .  That is, a $10 stock pays a dividend 
of $0.82, with franking credits of $0.35, if fully franked.  This franking credit is then worth $0.21 to 
the relevant investor.  To the extent that not all dividends are fully franked, the aggregate dividend 
yield on the market portfolio would have to be even higher than 8.2%.  Since the observed dividend 
yield on the market portfolio is an order of magnitude less than this, the assumptions of 5.0=γ , T = 
30% and MRPfc = 6% are dramatically inconsistent with observed market data. 
Finally, note that foreign investors do not benefit from franking credits.  Thus, setting the 
MRP to 6% including the value of franking credits is equivalent to assuming that foreign investors 
will provide capital in return for a 3.9% risk premium on the average stock.  Since this is 
demonstrably less than what has been obtained in every other domestic market, it fails the test of 
economic reasonableness. 
For all of these reasons, it seems impossible to sustain an argument that the 6% estimate of 
the MRP includes a 2.1% return from franking credits.   
 
MRP = 6% reflects dividends and capital gains only 
 
If the 6% estimate of MRP is assumed to exclude the value of franking credits, Equation (17) 
implies that: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]
%.6.8
%6
5.013.013.01
%6%6
111
=
−−−−
+=
−−−−
+= fdcffc rTT
MRPr
MRP γ
 
 
                                                 
3 Recall that gamma reflects (i) the rate at which the franking credits that are created by the payment of corporate tax 
are distributed to shareholders, and (ii) the value that the relevant shareholder places on each dollar of franking credits 
they receive.  It is common to assume that about 80% of created franking credits are distributed and that, once 
distributed, franking credits are worth about 60% of face value to the relevant investor.  ESCOSA document their use of 
a 60% estimate in the Draft 2005 - 2010 Electricity Distribution Price Determination and the QCA (2004) uses 62.5% in 
the Draft Determination Regulation of Electricity Distribution.  
(27)
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that is, the MRP including the value of franking credits is 8.6%. 
However, this is also dramatically inconsistent with observed data on dividend yields.  Recall 
that if γ = 0.5 and T = 30%, about 18% of the total return comes via franking credits.  Thus, the 
return from franking credits in this case is about 2.6%.  Using the same logic as the previous case, a 
dividend yield of 10% is required to distribute sufficient franking credits to warrant this return. 
 
Thus, however we interpret the MRP estimate of 6%, the standard set of parameter values 
produce results that are demonstrably inconsistent with each other and with observed data on 
dividend yields.  In the remainder of this section, therefore, we explore ways of restoring 
consistency by altering parameter values. 
 
4.2.  Changing parameter values to restore consistency 
 
γ = 0 
Setting the value of franking credits to zero is the most straightforward and most complete 
way to restore consistency.  In this case, a MRP of 6% is based on dividends and capital gains only.  
Observations pre- and post-imputation can be included in the same data set without adjustment.  
There are also no implications for how high or low dividend yields would have to be.  Importantly, 
no other parameter estimates would have to change.  Moreover, this is consistent with the most 
recent evidence from market data4 and from dividend drop offs5. 
It is also perfectly consistent with observed market practice. Truong, Partington and Peat 
(2005) survey 356 listed Australian firms about various corporate finance practices. All firms were 
included in the All Ordinaries Index in August 2004, Australian and not in the finance sector. On 
the question of how franking credits were treated, 85% of respondents indicated that they made no 
adjustment for the value of franking credits. 
Lonergan (2001) surveys expert valuation reports prepared in relation to takeovers. He reports 
that of 122 reports reviewed only 48 (or 39%) provided support showing how they had arrived at 
the WACC used in their reports.  Of these, 42 (or 88%) used the CAPM to compute the cost of 
equity capital and made no adjustment for dividend imputation.  Only six reports made any sort of 
adjustment to reflect dividend imputation.  Furthermore, of the few reports that did make an 
adjustment for the value of franking credits, for all but one the ultimate effect on the value of the 
company was negligible or zero.  Importantly, nearly half of Lonergan’s sample is from after the 
                                                 
4 Cannavan, Finn & Gray (2004). 
5 Bellamy & Gray (2004). 
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1997 introduction of the 45-day rule that was introduced to prevent trading in franking credits, yet 
only one expert report from this period made any mention of the value of franking credits. 
Lonergan (2001) also provides a list of conceptual grounds cited in reports for not adjusting 
for imputation credits, including: 
 The value of franking credits is dependent on the tax position of each individual 
shareholder; 
 There is no evidence that acquirers of businesses will pay additional value for surplus  
franking credits; 
 There is little evidence that the value effects of dividend imputation are being included 
in valuations being undertaken by companies and investors or the broader market; 
 Foreign shareholders are the marginal price-setters of the Australian market yet many 
such shareholders cannot avail themselves of the benefit of franking credits; and 
 There is a lack of certainty about future dividend policies, the timing of taxation and 
dividend payments and consequently about franking credits. 
Consequently, setting γ = 0 not only avoids the demonstrable internal inconsistency identified 
above, but it is also perfectly consistency with the dominant accepted market practice. 
 
MRPfc = 0 
The next possibility to consider is a reduction in the estimate of the MRP.  At the extreme, the 
all-inclusive MRP could be set to zero.  This implies that the average firm earns a total return equal 
to the risk-free rate, 6% in this case.  Once again, if γ = 0.5 and T = 30%, about 18% of this return 
(or 1.1%) is due to franking credits.  If franking credits are worth about 60% of their face value 
once distributed, a franking credit yield of 1.8% ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
6.0
%1.1  is required.  This requires a dividend yield 
of 4.12% if all dividends are assumed to be fully franked.  The actual dividend yield in the 
Australian market is relatively stable at around 4%, but not all of these dividends are fully franked.  
Thus, even when the all-inclusive MRP is set to zero, the dividend yield that is required to produce 
sufficient franking credits to justify setting gamma to 0.5 is above that which we observe in the 
market.  Moreover, the absence of any sort of risk premium whatsoever is completely implausible 
so this solution must be rejected. 
 
0 < MRPfc ≤ 8% 
Having rejected the case in which the all-inclusive market risk premium is equal to zero, we 
consider a range of positive values for the market risk-premium before considering more specific 
cases in detail. Historically, Australian excess equity market returns (over and above the yield on 
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10-year government bonds) have averaged around 7% p.a. (Dimson, Marsh and Staunton, 2003). 
Some recent literature which infers the market risk premium from analyst expectations argues that 
the market risk premium is less than this historical average. For instance, Claus and Thomas (1999) 
estimate the market risk premium which is consistent with analyst earnings forecasts and market 
prices from 1985-1998. They report a mean estimate of 3.4% for the United States and 2.8% for the 
United Kingdom. Fama and French (2002) estimate the market risk premium at around 3-4% by 
estimating total returns as the sum of dividend yield and expected growth in dividends or earnings. 
In addition, Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) contend that survivorship bias makes the historical 
average equity premium an upwardly-biased estimate of the forward-looking premium. 
The alternate view is that these effects have already been reflected in the 6% estimate that is 
commonly used in practice.6  The mean MRP in Australia from 1883 - 2004 is 7.3%.  Thus, an 
estimate of 6% is already well below the long-term mean.  Moreover, there is no evidence of a 
recent reduction in the MRP.  The mean MRP over the last 30 years (1975 - 2004) is 7.7%.  The 
mean MRP in the 30 year pre-imputation period (1958 - 87) is 7.3% and the mean MRP in the post-
imputation period (1991 - 2004) is 6.4%7.  In all these cases, MRP is estimated from dividends and 
capital gains only.  There is no statistical evidence of a reduction in the estimated MRP over time, 
nor any significant difference in the pre-and post-imputation period. 
However, appropriate estimation of the MRP is beyond the scope of this paper. We simply 
attempt to reconcile relative estimates of MRP and gamma with observed dividend yields to 
highlight any internal inconsistencies. We do this for a range of values for the MRP from 0 to 8%. 
For each point in this range, we examine the full range of values for gamma – from 0 to 1.  For each 
combination of MRP and gamma, we derive the minimum dividend yield that is required to produce 
the necessary volume of franking credits.  For example, we have shown above that when the MRP 
is 6% and gamma is 0.5, a fully-franked dividend yield of 8.2% is required to produce a sufficient 
volume of franking credits to justify the 2.1% yield from franking credits that is implicit in the other 
parameter estimates.  Figure 2 illustrates the minimum required dividend yield for a range of values 
for MRP and gamma.  
                                                 
6 Although this value is lower than the available data would suggest, it is consistent with Australian regulatory 
precedent and market practice as reported in Truong, Partington and Peat (2005). 
 
7 We omit the first few years of imputation in line with the conclusion of Brown and Clarke (1993) that the data from 
the introduction of imputation in 1987 through 1990 is not representative as “the market took some time to adjust to 
dividend imputation.” 
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Figure 2: Required minimum fully-franked dividend yield under alternative assumptions for 
the market risk premium and the value of franking credits 
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The first point to note from this figure is that gamma cannot be set to 0.5 or above.  Even 
when the MRP is set to 0, a fully-franked dividend yield of at least 4.1% is required to produce the 
assumed volume of franking credits.  For γ = 0.5 and a MRP of 4%, the fully-franked dividend yield 
must be more than 6%.  The market simply does not distribute a sufficient volume of franking 
credits to justify setting gamma to 0.5. 
At the other extreme, gamma may be set to 0.  In this case, the minimum required dividend 
yield is, of course, zero.  If franking credits are assumed to have no value to the relevant investor, 
there is no implicit assumption about how many franking credits must be distributed and therefore 
no constraint on the dividend yield.  This also applies regardless of the value of the MRP.  Thus, 
setting gamma to zero is consistent with any dividend yield that we observe and with any 
assumption about the MRP.   
Now consider an intermediate point.  Suppose that we set γ = 0.25 and MRP = 6%.  In this 
case, the total expected return on the market is 12%, of which 1.2% comes from franking credits.  A 
fully-franked dividend yield of 4.5% is required to distribute the required volume of franking 
credits in this case.  Thus, setting γ = 0.25 and MRP = 6% is reasonably consistent with observed 
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dividend yields.  What Figure 2 illustrates is that if MRP is set to 6%, the observed dividend yield 
constrains the value of gamma to 0.25 or less.8 
Similarly, Figure 2 shows that if the MRP is set to only 4%, the maximum value of gamma 
that can be reasonably entertained, in light of observed dividend yields, is around 0.3.  However, 
this implies that the expected market return is only 10% p.a., of which 1.1% comes from franking 
credits.  This implies that dividends and capital gains provide a premium of only 2.9% relative to 
government bonds, which is so far at odds with any interpretation of the available data that it could 
not possibly be considered to be reasonable.  
In summary, Figure 2 establishes that if gamma is set between 0 and 0.2, any value of the 
MRP between 0 and 8% is consistent with observed dividend yields.  Conversely, if the MRP is set 
to 6% (consistent with practice), the maximum value of gamma that can be reasonably considered 
(in light of observed dividend yields) is 0.3.  Higher values of gamma can co-exist with lower 
values of MRP, but on both scores this involves a move away from the empirical data and market 
practice.  Consequently, we consider this to be nothing more than a theoretical possibility.  Higher 
values of gamma and lower values of MRP are not inconsistent with observed dividend yields, but 
they are inconsistent with empirical estimates and market practice.    
 
T = 75%, MRPfc = 6% 
Consistency with observed dividend yields can be restored if the relevant corporate tax rate is 
assumed to be 75%, and the 6% estimate of MRP is assumed to include the value of franking 
credits.  In this case, the average firm earns a total return of 12% p.a., on average.  The proportion 
of this total return that is due to franking credits is: 
 
( )
( )( )
( ) %.605.0175.01
75.05.0
11
=−−=−− γ
γ
T
T  
 
That is, franking credits yield a return of 7.2%.  If franking credits are worth 60% of their face 
value once distributed, a franking credit yield of 12% ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
6.0
%2.7  is required.  At a tax rate of 75%, 
franking credits of $3.00 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−=− 75.01
75.0
1 T
T  can be distributed with every $1.00 of dividends.  Thus, 
a dividend yield of 4% in line with observed values, would be required.  Although consistency 
                                                 
8 Whether these are appropriate values for gamma and MRP is beyond the scope of this paper.  That question must be 
determined with reference to the available empirical data.  The point here is that given the value of one of these 
parameters, the observed dividend yield constrains the value of the other. 
(28)
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among parameters, and with observed dividend yields, is restored, a 75% tax rate is completely 
implausible so this approach must also be rejected.   
 
If only a single parameter is to be changed, the only alternative is to set γ = 0.  In the 
remainder of this section, we examine the possibility of simultaneously changing multiple 
parameters. 
 
γ  = 0.35, effT = 15%, statT =30%, MRPdc = 6% 
The final approach we examine sets γ = 0.35 and the MRP, excluding franking credits, to 6%.  
The latter assumption is consistent with observed data, after making a downward adjustment to 
reflect an assumed reduction in future MRP relative to past observations.  The value of γ  = 0.35 is 
from Hathaway and Officer (2004)9.  We continue to use a statutory tax rate of 30%, which implies 
that 43 cents of franking credits ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
− 3.01
3.0  can be distributed with each dollar of dividends.  Finally, 
we use an effective tax rate of 15%.  This suggests that Australian corporate taxes represent 15% of 
the corporate profits of Australian firms.  The most plausible reason for the effective tax rate being 
lower than the statutory rate is that a portion of the profits are earned offshore and taxed in another 
jurisdiction.  That is, the 15% rate is the proportion of Australian corporate tax (not total tax 
expense, which may include foreign taxes) to total corporate profit (which does include foreign-
sourced profits.)  However, if this were the only explanation, and if foreign corporate taxes were 
levied at 30%, half of all profits of Australian firms would need to be generated offshore.  To the 
extent that the Australian corporate tax rate is relatively high, the proportion of foreign-sourced 
profits would have to be even higher. 
Note that this cannot be reconciled by timing differences (e.g., generous depreciation 
allowances.)  This is because we are dealing with an aggregate of all firms over time.  Eventually, 
timing differences reverse, such that over a large sample of firms any such differences would be 
diversified away. 
Finally, note that the total Australian corporate tax paid does represent less than 30% of the 
total profits of Australian firms.  But this statistic is misleading in that minority interests are 
included in the pre-tax profit of the parent after tax has been paid by the subsidiary.  Suppose, for 
example, that a subsidiary earns a pre-tax profit of $100, pays $30 corporate tax and distributes a 
$70 dividend.  The 40% owner reports $28 ( )704.0 ×  as pre-tax profit and does not subtract 
                                                 
9 Recall that the purpose of the current paper is to examine the consistency of parameter estimates.  We do not address 
the appropriateness of the empirical techniques used to estimate gamma, nor the interpretation of the results.  We 
merely examine whether it is possible to make this reported value consistent with other parameter values and external 
data on dividend yields. 
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corporate tax (as it has already been paid.)  Thus, it appears as though some of the profits of the 
parent have not been taxed, when all corporate profits have actually been taxed when earned.  That 
is, the appearance of a low effective tax rate is a measurement problem and has no economic 
substance.  In a recent analysis, Buffini and Fabro (2005) report that the average tax rates of 
Australia’s largest 150 listed firms is 27-28.5%. 
In summary, the aggregate effective tax rate can only be as low as 15% if large amounts of 
Australian profits are earned (and taxed) offshore, inconsistent with observed data.  This can be 
considered to be very much a lower bound. 
Now, if the MRP from dividends and capital gains is 6%, the adjustment for the value of 
franking credits is: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]
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Thus, the total required return on the market portfolio is 12.7%.  Of this: 
 
( )
( )
( ) %,8.535.0115.01
35.0
11
=−−=−− γ
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T
T  
 
is due to franking credits.  That is, the return from franking credits is 0.74%.  If franking credits are 
worth about 60% once distributed, a franking credit yield of 1.5% ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
6.0
%74.0  is required.  This 
requires a dividend yield of 3.5%, which is broadly consistent with observed yields.  The key here is 
the accelerated distribution of franking credits—they are created by the payment of tax at 15%, but 
distributed in accordance with the statutory rate of 30%. 
The advantage of this approach is that the estimate of γ and MRP is based on reported 
empirical evidence.  The assumption of an effective tax rate of 15%, however, is extreme and 
implies that a very large proportion of Australian corporate profits must be sourced offshore. 
 
Conclusions 
In this section, we have reviewed a number of methods for restoring consistency between 
parameters and with observed data on dividend yields.  Setting γ  = 0 is the simplest approach, it 
completely eliminates all inconsistencies, it is consistent with the most recent published evidence, 
(31)
(32)
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and is consistent with the dominant market practice of corporate finance professionals and valuation 
experts. 
 
5. Empirical Adjustments to MRP estimates 
Some attempts have been made to adjust estimates of the MRP to reflect the assumed value of 
franking credits.  Some details relating to two such approaches have been provided by Australian 
regulators.  Again, we use data from the regulatory setting because regulators, in contrast to other 
market participants, provide explicit parameter estimates.  The following two examples highlight 
that, even in the cases where the estimated market risk premium explicitly incorporates an 
adjustment for franking credits, that adjustment is inadequate, given the typical assumption that γ = 
0.5.  To be consistent with observed returns from dividends and capital gains, either a lower value 
for γ  should be assumed, or a larger adjustment to the MRP is required. 
In the Review of Gas Access Arrangements Final Decision (2002, p. 324), the Victorian 
Essential Services Commission (ESC) implicitly notes that there are three components to the equity 
return: dividends, capital gains and franking credits.  The standard way in which equity returns are 
measured is in terms of dividends and capital gains only.  Thus, the value of franking credits must 
be added to any such measure (to the extent that franking credits have any value to the relevant 
investor).  The ESC reports that (p. 324), “its assumption about the value of franking credits 
requires an upward adjustment to the measured cash equity premium to add back the non-cash value 
of franking credits since 1987—which the Commission has estimated to add 0.2 percentage points 
onto the long term average.”  Further calculations indicate that this adjustment was applied by 
adding around 0.86% to each observation post 1987, thus increasing the average observed MRP 
from 1950 by 0.2%.  Since this affects 14 of 55 observations, each of those 14 observations must be 
higher by around 0.86% to cause the average over 55 observations to rise by 0.2%.  That is, the 
ESC values franking credits as providing a return of around 0.86% p.a. for the average stock (with 
an equity beta of 1).  The Essential Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA) (2004, p. 
179) has performed a similar adjustment reporting that, “if the non-cash value of franking credits 
for the period since 1987 are included” the mean MRP over 1882 - 2001 increases by 0.1%.  Since 
this affects 14 of 120 observations, each of those 14 observations must be higher by around 0.86% 
to cause the average over 120 observations to rise by 0.1%.  That is, like the ESC, ESCOSA also 
values franking credits as providing a return of around 0.86% p.a. for the average stock (equity beta 
of 1). 
Although neither regulator provides any detail about how this 0.86% p.a. return is calculated, 
it is possible to reverse engineer.  The aggregate dividend yield for the Australian market is around 
4%.  Given that around 10% of dividends are unfranked and that very few dividends are partially 
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franked, the yield of fully franked dividends is around 3.6% p.a.  Since the ratio of franking credits 
to dividends is 0.43:1 at a 30% tax rate, the yield of franking credits is about 1.7% p.a. 
( )%6.343.0 × .  If these franking credits are valued at around 60% of face value once distributed10, 
they add around 0.86% p.a ( )%7.16.0 ×  to market returns. 
However, this adjustment is demonstrably inconsistent with the maintained assumptions of 
γ = 0.5 and T  = 30%.  To see this, note that if the value of franking credits is 0.86% and if γ = 0.5, 
then the total amount of franking credits created (expressed as a percentage of equity value) must be 
%72.1
5.0
%86.0 = .  Since franking credits are created by the payment of Australian corporate tax, this 
also represents the amount of tax paid.  Thus, the average company return before corporate tax must 
be 5.73% ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
3.0
%72.1 , generating tax of 1.72% and an after company tax of return of only 4.01%.  
These values are all expressed as a percentage of the equity value.  If expressed as a percentage of 
total firm value, they are even lower!  Clearly these implied returns are economically unreasonable.   
Internal consistency demands that parameters be adjusted as illustrated in Section 4. Setting 
γ = 0 is the most straightforward adjustment, is consistent with the empirical evidence, and requires 
no adjustment to market returns whatsoever. 
The ESC has also sought to adjust its “ex-ante” estimates of MRP to account for the assumed 
value of franking credits.  In the Electricity Distribution Price Review Draft Decision (2000, p. 156-
8), the ESC notes that a “grossed-up” dividend yield, that includes the assumed value of franking 
credits, must be used.  This implies that the return to equity-holders is: 
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where 
o
o
P
D is the current dividend yield and g is the perpetual growth rate of dividends (and earnings 
if the payout ratio is assumed to be constant).  As well as applying to individual stocks, this 
relationship also applies to the market in aggregate.  In this case, the dividend yield and growth rate 
are interpreted as market wide estimates. 
Using estimate of 5.0=γ and T  = 30%, and a dividend yield of 4% (consistent with recent 
data), the expected return on the market portfolio is: 
 
                                                 
10 Recall that the QCA and ESCOSA have explicitly quantified this value. 
(33)
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Subtracting the risk-free rate from both sides yields: 
 
.%86.4 ffm rgrrMRP −+=−=  
 
The ESC then assumes that the growth rate is equal to the risk-free rate, giving a MRP 
estimate of 4.86%.  At a risk-free rate of 5.72%, the expected return on the average stock is 10.6%.  
This 10.6% expected return is made up of three components, including (i) Dividend 4% p.a.; (ii) 
Franking credits 0.86% p.a.; and (iii) Capital gains 5.72% p.a. 
Once again, the adjustment for the value of franking credits is demonstrably inconsistent with 
the maintained assumptions of 5.0=γ and T = 30%.  If franking credits have a value to investors of 
only 0.86% the average firm must return only 4.01% after company tax which equates to 5.73% 
before company tax.  Consider a $100 stock.  The company generates pre-tax earnings of $5.73, 
pays tax of 72.1$73.53.0 =× and creates franking credits worth $1.72.  It then pays a dividend of 
$4.00 and attaches the $1.72 franking credit. (Note that 72.1
3.01
3.000.4 =− .)  This credit is then worth 
0.86 to the recipient.  Since the value of the credit equals half the amount of credits created this is 
consistent with 5.0=γ . Clearly, a 4% after-tax return is economically unreasonable.  It is also 
inconsistent with the ex-ante model, because there are no residual earnings to be reinvested to 
generate future growth.  Thus, there is no scope for any capital gain component of returns, so g = 0.  
However, we cannot consider a higher return, because then more tax would be paid and more 
franking credits would be created and this would be inconsistent with the assumption that 5.0=γ .  
Noting that not all franking credits are immediately distributed does not help either.  This is because 
gamma is the ratio of the value of franking credits to the amount of credits created not distributed. 
That is, the combination of parameters that has been assumed is simply impossible to sustain, 
given an observed dividend yield of around 4%. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we use several approaches to formally derive the mathematically deterministic 
relationship that exists between the cost of capital parameters under the Officer (1994) framework.  
This same relationship applies regardless of whether the value of franking credits is reflected in the 
discount rate or the cash flows.  The relationship we derive is exactly equivalent to that derived, in 
different ways, by Officer (1994) and Lally (2004). 
(34)
(35)
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We further demonstrate that the parameter values that have been adopted as standard in 
Australian regulatory determinations violate this relationship.  The parameters are collectively 
inconsistent with each other and with external data on dividend yields.  Thus, one or more 
parameter estimates must be changed in order to restore internal consistency.  We examine several 
possible parameter changes and note that most of these possibilities require that at least one 
parameter be set at an economically implausible value (75% corporate tax rates, for example.) 
Our examination of regulatory practice is driven by the fact that (i) it is economically 
important, with more than $100 billion of infrastructure assets being regulated; and (ii) the 
regulatory process is transparent in the sense that individual parameter values are made available.  
Corporate practice is obviously less transparent in this regard.   
The evidence we present on typical parameter estimates is from the regulatory setting, 
because of its transparency.  Parameter estimates used by equity analysis and individual bankers are 
expected to vary more widely and we are loathe to make assumptions about “typical” estimates, 
given the lack of available data.  However, the corporate situation where parameter estimates are 
made explicitly is expert valuation reports produced during takeover proceedings.  These reports 
always contain a discounted cash flow valuation of the target firm.  The standard practice is to make 
no adjustment to the cash flows or the discount rate to reflect the value of franking credits.  This is 
equivalent to setting γ = 0, which is consistent with the empirical evidence relating to Australian 
listed firms.  It also restores the internal consistency among cost of capital parameters and with 
external data on dividend yields.  Since this is also the simplest adjustment to make to the standard 
set of regulatory parameters and is the most economically reasonable, we suggest that the corporate 
approach should be generally adopted. 
This means that no adjustment for franking credits is required when estimating the MRP.  
Moreover, it enables pre- and post-imputation observed market returns to be added together as 
equivalent units, which is practically important given the long data sets required to estimate this 
parameter. 
If however, franking credits are assumed to have value, it is essential that the cost of capital 
parameters are shown to collectively satisfy the relationship in Equation (17) and be consistent with 
the observed data on dividend yields.  To date, this challenge (or minimum requirement) has not 
been met by Australian regulators. 
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